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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
I. VOLUNTEERS INELIGIBLE FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION: SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION OVER COMPENSATION AGREEMENTS UNSETTLED
In McCreery v. Covenant Presbyterian Church' the South Caro-
lina Court of Appeals held that a volunteer is not an employee under
the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act2 and that the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction can be raised in a workers' compensation
case even though the Workers' Compensation Commission approved a
prior compensation agreement.
3
In 1984 the Session of Covenant Presbyterian Church (Covenant)
decided to assist in the formation of a new church, Grace Presbyterian
Chapel (Grace), in Murrells Inlet, South Carolina. Grace entered into a
contract with A.B.C. Enterprises, Inc. (A.B.C.) to build the new
church. A.B.C. provided the building materials and the churches fur-
nished volunteer labor.
4
In September 1985 James McCreery, a volunteer and A.B.C.'s
President, injured himself when he fell at the construction site. In Jan-
uary 1986 McCreery and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Covenant's
insurance provider, reached a compensation agreement that the Work-
ers' Compensation Commission accepted in a form order.5
In July 1986 Auto-Owners stopped making payments to McCreery.
Thereafter, Auto-Owners and Covenant petitioned the Workers' Com-
pensation Commission to set aside the award. They asserted that Mc-
Creery was not Covenant's employee and that the Commission was
without subject matter jurisdiction to order an award.' A single com-
missioner held that (1) the mistake about McCreery's status could not
be used to set aside the award; (2) the Commission's award was not
subject to a collateral attack; and (3) McCreery was Covenant's em-
ployee.' The full commission affirmed. The circuit court, on appeal,
held that the compensation was the law of the case and was not subject
1. 299 S.C. 218, 383 S.E.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1989).
2. Id. at 223-24, 383 S.E.2d at 267. The South Carolina Workers' Compensation
Law's definition of employee is found in section 42-1-130 of the South Carolina Code.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
3. McCreery, 299 S.C. at 222-23, 383 S.E.2d at 266.
4. Id. at 220, 383 S.E.2d at 265.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 220-21, 383 S.E.2d at 265.
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to collateral attack. The court of appeals reversed."
The court of appeals first examined the effect of the compensation
agreement on the Workers' Compensation Commission's jurisdiction
over McCreery's claim. The court held that "the issue of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction may be raised although an agreement for compensation
was executed and approved by the Commission,"9 because the Com-
mission's jurisdiction depends on the existence of an employer and em-
ployee relationship at the time of the alleged injury.10 The court relied
primarily on North Carolina case law to reach this decision."" In
Reaves v. Earle-Chesterfield Mill Co.,1 2 a case similar to McCreery, the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the parties' original compen-
sation agreement and subsequent compensation payments could not
constitute waiver of jurisdiction. 3
In an earlier case, Carter v. Associated Petroleum Carriers,14 the
South Carolina Supreme Court applied the general principle that sub-
ject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived to the Workers' Compensa-
tion Commission. The McCreery holding can be viewed as a logical but
limited extension of Carter. The McCreery court, however, emphasized
that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply because no evidentiary
hearing occurred before the Commission approved the compensation
agreement.
The court decided that the compensation agreement did not fore-
close review of the existence of an employer and employee relationship
and held that McCreery was a volunteer rather than an employee
under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. 5 The Act de-
fines an "employee" as a "person engaged in an employment under any
appointment, contract of hire or apprenticeship express or implied
.... "Is In the absence of a South Carolina court's interpretation of
the law on the issue, the court looked to North Carolina Workers'
Compensation cases. The North Carolina courts interpret "employee"
as a person who works for wages or salary and has the right to demand
payment for services.1 7 In the absence of any evidence that Covenant
8. Id. at 220, 383 S.E.2d at 265.
9. Id. at 222-23, 383 S.E.2d at 266.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
11. See Lemmerman v. A.T. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 350 S.E.2d 83 (1986);
Lucas v. Li'l Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 221 S.E.2d 257 (1976).
12. 216 N.C. 462, 5 S.E.2d 305 (1939).
13. Id. at 465, 5 S.E.2d at 306.
14. 235 S.C. 80, 110 S.E.2d 8 (1959).
15. McCreery, 299 S.C. at 221, 383 S.E.2d at 265.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
17. See Lemmerman v. A.T. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 585-86, 350 S.E.2d 83,
89 (1986); Lucas v. Li'l Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 219, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976). The
legislature patterned the Workers' Compensation Act after North Carolina's Act. Conse-
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paid McCreery or that McCreery could demand payment, the court of
appeals held that McCreery was not eligible for compensation. 8
The McCreery court wisely excluded volunteers from workers'
compensation benefits. Although this exclusion admittedly may work a
hardship on injured volunteers, the decision relieves organizations that
are heavily dependent on volunteer labor from the burden of ex-
panding their workers' compensation coverage to include volunteers.
The McCreery decision is unsettling, however, because it is not clear
when a compensation agreement that is approved by the Workers'
Compensation Commission is the final conclusion of a dispute. If par-
ties can relitigate seemingly settled cases because they did not have an
evidentiary hearing, attorneys can refuse to accept a settlement offer
until the Commission has held an evidentiary hearing. This uncer-
tainty will discourage negotiated claim settlements and, thus, will in-
crease the Commission's case load, hamper judicial economy, and re-
tard dispute resolution. The courts need to clarify the law in this area
to restore confidence in negotiated settlements.
Michael Don Stokes
II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION HAS EXCLUSIVE SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION OVER DISPUTE BETWEEN INSURER AND INSURED
In Labouseur v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.'9 the South
Carolina Court of Appeals held that the South Carolina Workers' Com-
pensation Commission (Commission) has exclusive subject matter ju-
risdiction over an action "brought by an employer against a workers'
compensation insurance carrier and the carrier's agent for an alleged
cancellation of a workers' compensation insurance policy."' The court
found that the Commission had jurisdiction even though the em-
ployee's rights were not directly involved.2 1
John Labouseur, owner and operator of Turpins, a restaurant,
sued Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company (Harleysville) and its
quently, the opinions of North Carolina courts interpreting the Act are given substantial
weight by South Carolina courts. Carter v. Penney Tire and Recapping Co., 261 S.C. 341,
348-49, 200 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1973).
18. McCreery, 299 S.C. at 223-24, 383 S.E.2d at 267.
19. 298 S.C. 213, 379 S.E.2d 291 (Ct. App. 1989).
20. Id. at 214, 379 S.E.2d at 292. Authorization for the Commission's jurisdiction is
found in section 42-3-180 of the South Carolina Code. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3-180 (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
21. A workers' compensation claim was pending before the Commission at the time
of the decision. Record at 31.
1990]
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agent R.V. Chandler and Sons, Inc., (Chandler)22 over the alleged can-
cellation of Labouseur's workers' compensation insurance policy.
Labouseur asserted two causes of action in his complaint. He sought a
declaratory judgment to determine his policy coverage at the time of
an employee's employment related accident, and he requested damages
for wrongful termination of his workers' compensation policy.
23
The Court of Common Pleas in Greenville denied Harleysville's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the insur-
ance company appealed. The circuit court based its decision on Nich-
ols v. State Farm Insurance Co.24 in which the South Carolina Su-
preme Court recognized a cause of action for bad faith refusal by an
insurer to pay first-party benefits to the insured. The circuit court de-
termined that Labouseur's cause of action concerned a similar bad
faith cancellation and failure to maintain a contract of insurance, and,
therefore, the court denied Harleysville's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 5
In its analysis the court of appeals focused on the language of the
South Carolina statute that vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Commis-
sion over "[a]ll questions arising under" the South Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act unless otherwise agreed on by the parties or pro-
vided for in the Code. 6 Because no specific provision in the statute
exempts the cancellation of a workers' compensation policy from the
Commission's jurisdiction, the court of appeals determined that this
exclusive jurisdiction necessarily included jurisdiction over issues of
policy coverage and carrier liability.27  Furthermore, both of
Labouseur's causes of action were based on the alleged policy cancella-
tion by Harleysville and Chandler.28 The court of appeals restated the
settled South Carolina law that "the Court will refuse a declaration
'where a special statutory remedy has been provided .... , "29
The court of appeals also examined two decisions from other juris-
dictions that addressed issues and statutes similar to those presented
in Labouseur. In Greene v. Spivey3° the insurance carrier challenged
22. The court of appeals rejected Labouseur's contention that the agent was not
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction and found that, if it was necessary, Chandler
could be made a party to the proceeding to rule on the coverage and cancellation issues.
Labouseur, 298 S.C. at 218, 379 S.E.2d at 293-94.
23. Id. at 215, 379 S.E.2d at 292.
24. 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616 (1983).
25. Record at 32.
26. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 42-3-180 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
27. Labouseur, 298 S.C. at 215, 379 S.E.2d at 292.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 216, 379 S.E.2d at 292 (citing Williams Furniture Corp. v. Southern Coat-
ings and Chem. Co., 216 S.C. 1, 7, 56 S.E.2d 576, 578 (1949)).
30. 236 N.C. 435, 73 S.E.2d 488 (1952).
[ ol. 42
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the North Carolina Industrial Commission's jurisdiction to determine
the carrier's liability under a workers' compensation insurance con-
tract. The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the language of
the state's Workmen's Compensation Act vested jurisdiction in the
North Carolina Industrial Commission "to hear and determine ques-
tions of fact and law [on] the existence of insurance coverage and lia-
bility of the insurance carrier.
'31
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Hawaii Roofing, Inc.a 2 the Hawaii
Supreme Court interpreted the state's workmen's compensation stat-
ute to give the state's commission exclusive jurisdiction over a contro-
versy between two insurance carriers. The court stated that the statu-
tory language "preclude[d] original court action to settle controversies
involving the workers' compensation law" and, thereby, "relegate[d]
the circuit court to a secondary role where workers' compensation is
concerned - the enforcement of the [Commission's] decisions.' 33
With support from other jurisdictions in decisions that addressed
statutory language and issues similar to those in Labouseur, the South
Carolina Court of Appeals proceeded to analyze South Carolina case
law on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. The court focused
on the two basic issues of policy cancellation and damages under the
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act to determine the proper
jurisdiction of the dispute between the insurer and Labouseur2
4
In analyzing the policy cancellation issues under South Carolina
case law, the court of appeals closely examined the South Carolina Su-
preme Court's opinion in Banks v. Batesburg Hauling Co.3" and found
support in Banks for the Commission's exclusive subject matter juris-
diction on the issue of policy cancellation.3" In Banks the insurance
carrier challenged the Commission's regulation that required carriers
to notify the Commission of policy cancellations.3 7 The South Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the regulation and the Commission's finding on
the policy cancellation in Banks, and, therefore, the court of appeals in
Labouseur reasoned "that the supreme court recognized, albeit implic-
itly, that subject matter jurisdiction to decide questions relating to the
cancellation of a workers' compensation policy reposes exclusively in
the Commission . . . ."3 Moreover, the court of appeals determined
that the regulation of policy cancellations in this manner "served
31. Id. at 445, 73 S.E.2d at 495-96 (citations omitted).
32. 64 Haw. 380, 641 P.2d 1333 (1982).
33. Id. at 384, 641 P.2d at 1336.
34. See Labouseur, 298 S.C. at 216-18, 379 S.E.2d at 293-94.
35. 202 S.C. 273, 24 S.E.2d 496 (1943).
36. Labouseur, 298 S.C. at 216-17, 379 S.E.2d at 293.
37. 202 S.C. at 276-77, 24 S.E.2d at 497.
38. 298 S.C. at 216-17, 379 S.E.2d at 293.
1990]
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merely to effectuate the purposes of the workers' compensation act."39
The court of appeals then examined the relationship of damages to
subject matter jurisdiction. Labouseur sought damages equal to the
amount he would have received to compensate the injured employee.4 0
The court of appeals' analysis on this point was straightforward:
"Clearly, the question of the amount of compensation, if any, payable
to an employee injured in an industrial accident is one that 'aris[es]
under' the act.' '4 Thus, the court of appeals determined that the Com-
mission must retain exclusive jurisdiction based upon the issue of dam-
ages. The court cited Cook v. Mack's Transfer & Storage4 2 to support
its logic. 43
In Cook an injured employee sued his employer and its workers'
compensation insurance carrier for bad faith refusal to pay workers'
compensation benefits. As in Labouseur, the plaintiff in Cook relied on
Nichols v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.44 in which
the court recognized a cause of action for an insurer's bad faith refusal
to pay first party benefits.45 The plaintiffs in both Labouseur and Cook
argued that they were injured by the insurer's refusal to pay benefits
under the contract, which was a claim that appeared to go beyond the
Commission's jurisdiction.46 In Cook, however, the court awarded dam-
ages based on the benefits owed to the plaintiff under the Workers'
Compensation Act. The Labouseur opinion, therefore, built upon the
precedent established in Cook when it maintained the Commission's
jurisdiction of all issues that arise under the Workers' Compensation
Act.
The court of appeals in Labouseur also concluded that the ques-
tions which concerned policy coverage and policy cancellation should
be resolved by the Commission in its regular administrative proceed-
ings on the injured employee's claim.4 7 The court cited Larson's trea-
tise on workers' compensation law'8 in support of its conclusion on the
resolution of the policy and coverage cancellation. The court, however,
failed to note that Larson distinguishes cases that require a determina-
39. Id. at 217, 379 S.E.2d at 293.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 291 S.C. 84, 352 S.E.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 292 S.C. 230, 355 S.E.
2d 861 (1987).
43. Labouseur, 298 S.C. at 217, 379 S.E.2d at 293.
44. 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616 (1983).
45. Cook, 291 S.C. at 88-89, 352 S.E.2d at 299.
46. Compare id. with Labouseur, 298 S.C. at 215, 379 S.E.2d at 292 (similarity of
plaintiffs' claims in Cook and Labouseur).
47. 298 S.C. at 217, 379 S.E.2d at 293.
48. 4 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 92.40 to -.42 (1989).
[Vol. 42
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tion of an employee's rights from those cases that do not require this
determination.4 9 Larson asserts that a Commission's exclusive jurisdic-
tion in cases that involve employee's rights is "in harmony with the
conception of compensation insurance as being something more than
an independent contractual matter between insurer and insured."5
When the employee's rights are not involved, however, Larson asserts
that many commissions "disavow jurisdiction and send the parties to
the courts for relief."'"
Larson particularly observes that disputes about liability or policy
coverage between an insurer and the insured that do not directly con-
cern an employee's rights probably will be resolved in court.52 The Ha-
waii Supreme Court, however, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Hawaii
Roofing, Inc.5 3 rejected an argument similar to Larson's theory and em-
phasized the need to examine closely each jurisdiction's workers' com-
pensation law when it stated that "[w]hat appears persuasive at first
sight is nevertheless vitiated by its inappropriateness, as [such] cases
[construe] statutory grants of authority definitely narrower in scope
... ,"I The Hawaii court's approach was not unique, "[f]or courts in
other states have rejected efforts to evade the authority of administra-
tive agencies entrusted with the administration of workers' compensa-
tion laws. .... ,,55 Thus, in some cases in which a court ruled against a
commission's jurisdiction over disputes that were not ancillary to the
employee's claim, the court's ruling was founded on narrow language in
the jurisdiction's workers' compensation statutes.5 6
In the court of appeals' analysis of ancillary claims and jurisdic-
tion in Labouseur the South Carolina Court of Appeals cited certain
cases used by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Travelers and by Larson
in his treatise. One example is Spivey v. Oakley's General Contrac-
tors5 7 in which the North Carolina Court of Appeals examined the
same issue as the court in Labouseur examined, which was "whether,
49. See id. § 92.41, at 17-44 to -54.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 92.42, at 17-54.
52. See id. § 92.42, at 17-54 to -58.
53. 64 Haw. 380, 641 P.2d 1333 (1982).
54. Id. at 386, 641 P.2d at 1337.
55. Id. at 387, 641 P.2d at 1338.
56. In State Accident Ins. Fund Corp. v. Broadway Cab Co., 52 Or. App. 689, 629
P.2d 829 (1981), the court found that the board lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the issue of insurance coverage. The relevant statute, however, strictly limited the juris-
diction of the commission to matters concerning claims. In Jordan v. Ferro, 67 N.J.
Super. 188, 170 A.2d 69 (Law. Div. 1961), the court similarly construed strictly the statu-
tory jurisdiction of the commission over all claims to exclude questions that concern
coverage.
57. 32 N.C. App. 488, 232 S.E.2d 454 (1977).
1990]
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after the employer has settled with the. employee, the North Carolina
Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to determine whether a policy
of compensation insurance has been properly cancelled. '58 The North
Carolina court held that the "Uj]urisdiction of the Commission is not
limited solely to questions arising out of an employer-employee rela-
tionship or to the determination of rights asserted by or on behalf of
an injured employee.""9
In Williams Furniture Corp. v. Southern Coatings and Chemical
Co.60 a South Carolina case cited by the Labouseur and Travelers
courts, the supreme court found that the Commission had exclusive
jurisdiction "ordinarily, [and] particularly where questions of fact are
involved, the courts should refrain from invading the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Commission."6 1 Thus, the Labouseur opinion has support
for its recognition of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission to
decide all questions arising under the South Carolina Workers' Com-
pensation Act in both statutory and case law.
The purpose of the Act is "to provide a remedy for employees who
sustain work related injuries." 2 Furthermore, "[tihe Workers' Com-
pensation Act provides an exclusive system of compensation in deroga-
tion of common law rights and is not cumulative or supplemental
thereto, but wholly substitutional.16 3 Therefore, if the court of appeals
recognized an independent cause of action for bad faith refusal to pay
benefits as in Cook or bad faith cancellation of compensation policy as
in Labouseur, it would "deprive the Commission of a jurisdiction the
Legislature has decreed that it, and it alone, possesses to decide work-
ers' compensation claims."' 64 The court of appeals in Labouseur refused
to recognize an independent action outside the legislative framework of
the Workers' Compensation Act for any action arising under the South
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. This decision is a straightfor-
ward interpretation of the statutory language that creates the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission over all actions "arising under" the
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.
ADDENDUM
On October 29, 1990, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
58. Id. at 489, 232 S.E.2d at 455.
59. Id. at 491, 232 S.E.2d at 456 (citation omitted).
60. 216 S.C. 1, 56 S.E.2d 576 (1949).
61. Id. at 9, 56 S.E.2d at 579.
62. Cook v. Mack's Transfer & Storage, 291 S.C. 84, 86, 352 S.E.2d 296, 298 (Ct.
App. 1986), cert. denied, 292 S.C. 230, 355 S.E.2d 861 (1987).
63. Id. at 87, 352 S.E.2d at 298.
64. Id. at 89, 352 S.E.2d at 299.
[Vol. 42
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but modified Labouseur v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. 5 to
clarify the court of appeals' decision and to provide jurisdictional
guidelines in this area. 6  The court acknowledged the difficulty in de-
termining the proper forum for a bad faith or wrongful cancellation
action when the basic question is whether the cancellation was proper,
which is a question within the jurisdiction of the Commission when it
arises in connection with an employee's compensation claim."'
Therefore, in a clarifying opinion, the supreme court adopted the
approach of other jurisdictions as outlined in the Larson treatise on
workers' compensation law:68
[W]hen there is a pending employee claim for compensation, the.ex-
clusive jurisdiction for the determination of questions concerning can-
cellation, coverage, construction of insurance contracts, and the like, is
in the Workers' Compensation Commission. On the other hand, when
no pending employee claim for compensation exists, the Commission
lacks the jurisdiction to decide such questions. 9
Furthermore, the court explained that "the Commission is never
the proper forum for a bad/faith wrongful cancellation action.
'70
Therefore, the circuit court was the proper forum for Labouseur's
wrongful termination action; however, he had to await the Commis-
sion's determination of the employee's compensation claim before he
could bring the wrongful termination action in circuit court. In adopt-
ing these guidelines, the supreme court has provided a straightforward,
jurisdictional framework for the courts and the bar.
Christie Newman Barrett
III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION CARRIER MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENT SAFETY INSPECTION
In Ancrum v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.7 1 the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the South Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision bars an injured em-
ployee's action against a workers' compensation carrier "except when
the carrier stands in the position of a third party unrelated to its func-
65. No. 23289, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 21 (S.C. Oct. 29, 1990).
66. Id., slip op. at 4.
67. Id., slip op. at 5.
68. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
69. Labouseur, No. 23289, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 21, slip op. at 5-6 (S.C. Oct. 29,
1990)..
70. Id., slip op. at 6.
71. - S.C. _ 389 S.E.2d 645 (1989).
1990]
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tion as a carrier.17 2
Edgar Ancrum, the plaintiff, was injured severely when his cloth-
ing was caught in an unshielded gear at Stoller Chemical Corporation's
plant. As a result, Ancrum's arms were severed. He sued his employer's
workers' compensation carrier, United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company (Fidelity), in the United States District Court. Ancrum
claimed that Fidelity negligently conducted safety inspections at
Stoller's plant.73 District Court Judge Sol Blatt, Jr. certified the follow-
ing question to the South Carolina Supreme Court:
Does the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, and its exclu-
sive remedy provisions, bar an action by an employee, injured while
acting in the course and scope of his employment, against the em-
ployer's workers' compensation carrier based upon that carrier's negli-
gence in performing safety inspections when the carrier voluntarily
performs these inspections?
714
Because the record did not include the insurance contract, the supreme
court stated that the district court must apply the new rule and sug-
gested that the district court follow certain guidelines.
75
The Act's third party provision expressly limits immunity to the
employer.7 6 Section 42-1-560 of the Act, however, seems to indicate
that persons other than the employer may be exempt from liability
under section 42-1-540:
The right to compensation and other benefits under this Title shall
not be affected by the fact that the injury or death is caused under
circumstances creating a legal liability in some person, other than the
employer or another person exempt from liability under section 42-1-
540 to pay damages therefor, the person so liable being hereinafter
referred to as the third party.
77
72. Id. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 646.
73. See id. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 645.
74. Id.
75. Id. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 646.
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-550 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The provision reads as follows:
When an employee, his personal representative or other person may have a
right to recover damages for injury, loss of service or death from any person
other than the employer, he may institute an action at law against such third
person before an award is made under this Title and prosecute it to its final
determination.
Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. § 42-1-560 (emphasis added). Employer is defined as "the State and all
political subdivisions thereof, all public and quasi-public corporations therein, every per-
son carrying on any employment and the legal repre'sentatiave of a deceased person or
the receiver or trustee of any person." Id. § 42-1-140. A carrier, or insurer, is defined as
"any person or fund authorized under § 42-5-20 to insure under this Title and includes
self-insurers." Id. § 42-1-60.
[Vol. 42
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In addition, the Act defines "employer" and "carrier" separately and
these definitions do not include common elements."
Prior South Carolina cases have favored extending the employer's
immunity to the carrier. In Hill v. Skinner9 the court stated that the
insurer "stands in the shoes of its insured employer, having his rights
and being subject to his obligations."80 In Whitten v. American Mu-
tual Liability Insurance Co.81 a federal district court recognized a
workers' compensation carrier as "the 'alter ego' of the employer" and
found the carrier immune from suit by an employee for failure to make
compensation payments.8 2 Though factually distinguishable from An-
crum, Whitten reflects the South Carolina courts' willingness to extend
immunity to the carrier.
South Carolina patterned its Act after the North Carolina Act
and, thus, the courts often cite decisions that construe the North Caro-
lina Workers' Compensation Act.83 In Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co.8 4 a federal district court, construing North Carolina law, held
that the carrier was immune from suit by an injured employee who
alleged negligent safety inspection by the carrier.8 5 Accordingly, a com-
parison of Smith and Ancrum indicates that the North Carolina and
South Carolina courts are in accord in extending the employer's immu-
nity from suit to the carrier.
In Kifer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.88 the Eighth Circuit,
noting "that the rule of law adopted in most of the decisions permit-
ting this type of action against the workers' compensation carrier has
been overturned by statutory amendment,"' 7 expressly recognized a
legislative trend toward granting immunity to carriers.8 In addition,
the Kifer court stated that the failure to extend immunity to the car-
rier could cause,
the potential for unlimited liability of workers' compensation carriers,
a substantial increase in workers' compensation insurance premiums
78. Id. § 42-1-560(a).
79. 195 S.C. 330, 11 S.E.2d 386 (1940).
80. Id. at 335, 11 S.E.2d at 388.
81. 468 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1977), af'd, 594 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1979).
82. Id. at 474-75.
83. See, e.g., Carter v. Penney Tire and Recapping Co., 261 S.C. 341, 348, 200
S.E.2d 64, 67 (1973) ("particularly persuasive is the decision of the North Carolina
Court, because, as previously held, our Workmen's Compensation Act was fashioned af-
ter the North Carolina Act and the opinions of the North Carolina Court construing such
Act are entitled to great weight with this Court ... ." Id.).
84. 449 F. Supp. 928 (M.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1979).
85. Id. at 929, 934.
86. 777 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1985).
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for all employers, the abandonment of many safety programs cur-
rently undertaken by workers' compensation carriers, and a break-
down in the expeditious and informal administration of workers' com-
pensation claims, all to the detriment of employees and employers
alike.el
The Third Circuit responded to this argument in Mays v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co..Y' The Mays court stated that a safety inspec-
tion program has many practical advantages and carriers will continue
the practice even under the threat of potential liability.91 Furthermore,
even if carriers discontinue the practice, no inspection is preferabale to
a negligent inspection.9 2
Some jurisdictions have found a middle ground between carrier li-
ability and immunity for negligent inspections. The Alabama courts
have denied immunity to the carrier for negligent safety inspection in
some instances. 3 In Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co. v. Cole-
man "4 the Alabama Supreme Court found that the workers' compensa-
tion carrier was also the employer's liability insurer and held the car-
rier liable because it was not acting strictly within its role as a workers'
compensation carrier when it inspected the premises.9 5 In United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Jones9 the supreme court found
the carrier liable because the carrier was authorized but not required
to inspect job sites for safety.9 7 Both cases indicate that a carrier may
be held liable when its negligent safety inspection is performed in some
role other than as a workers' compensation carrier.
In Latour v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.98 a Rhode Island
District Court held that a workers' compensation carrier, which was
also the employer's general liability insurer and risk management con-
sultant, was not immune for negligent inspections performed in its ca-
pacity as liability insurer and consultant.99 The court stated that "im-
munity is essentially a functional concept which attaches to activities,
not entities" and that "workers' compensation carriers should enjoy
89. Id. at 1334.
90. 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963).
91. Id. at 178.
92. See Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 1327, 121 N.W.2d
361, 366 (1963).
93. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1980);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jones, 356 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1977).
94. 394 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1980).
95. Id. at 335, 338-39.
96. 356 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1977).
97. Id. at 597-98.
98. 528 F. Supp. 231 (D.R.I. 1981).
99. Id. at 233, 236.
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immunity from liability only for activities undertaken in their capacity
as compensation insurers." 10 0 Likewise, courts in Georgia and Vermont
have held that their respective workers' compensation statutes do not
confer absolute immunity on a compensation carrier that conducts a
negligent safety inspection.0 1
Professor Arthur Larson proposes a solution to the third party lia-
bility problem which utlizes a functional approach distinguishing be-
tween "the carrier's function of payment for benefits and services, on
the one hand, and, on the other, any function it assumes in the way of
direct or physical performance of services related to the act." 2 The
Ancrum court seems to have adopted a functional approach to the is-
sue of carrier immunity, but not the distinction suggested by Professor
Larson. Instead, the court held that liability depends on whether the
safety inspections were carried out by the carrier as part of its role as a
workers' compensation carrier or as "an independent provider of safety
inspections."1 03 If inspections are performed in a role as carrier, the
carrier is immune from suit. If inspections are performed "in the posi-
tion of a third party unrelated to its function as compensation carrier,"
negligent inspection could subject the carrier to liability.0 ' The An-
crum court stated that "[ejvidence of such an arrangement could in-
clude specific contractual language or payment of additional fees for
these services." 105
The Ancrum decision is consistent with both prior South Carolina
court decisions and the majority rule. While generally preserving car-
rier immunity, Ancrum provides the employee with a new avenue for
bringing a third party suit against the carrier when the carrier per-
forms inspections as an "independent provider of safety inspec-
100. Id. at 234.
101. Newton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Ga. App. 694, 252 S.E.2d 199 (1979)
(when insurer issues both workers' compensation and liability policy, it is entitled to
immunity only if it performs the inspection solely in its workers' compensation role);
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Day, 136 Ga. App. 359, 221 S.E.2d 467 (1975) (when in-
surer provides coverage under two policies it is immune from liability for negligent in-
spections only if performed in its role as workers' compensation carrier); Sims v. Ameri-
can Casualty Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121, aff'd sub nom. Providence
Washington Ins. Co. v. Sims, 232 Ga. 787, 209 S.E.2d 61 (1974) (workers' compensation
carrier is not immune when it performs negligent safety inspection in connection with
duties other than as compensation carrier). Derosia v. Duro Metal Prods. Co., 147 Vt.
410, 519 A.2d 601 (1986) (in answer to certified questions supreme court held that a
carrier's immunity is not absolute).
102. 2A A- LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.97, at 14-328
(1989).
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tions."'106 Therefore, any facts which indicate that a carrier performed
negligent inspections separate and apart from its role as compensation
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